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Proprietary Remedies: Distributive or
Commutative?
DARRYN JENSEN*
Distributive justice and commutative justice accounts of private law are founded upon different
hypotheses about the relationship between law and the state. Adopting a commutative justice
account has three important consequences in relation to the justification of proprietary remedies.
First, the question as to what relief(personal orproprietary) should be awarded will be a question
about whether the claimant isjustified in demanding that the defendant transfer a particular asset
to the claimant. Secondly, the insolvency of the defendant is not relevant to whether relief ought
to be proprietary. Thirdly, multiple party cases need to be understood as conglomerations of two-
party cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether proprietary relief, as opposed to a monetary award, is available can
be of immense significance to claimants, particularly where defendants are
insolvent. There is a considerable body of scholarly literature which addresses
this issue and a diversity of opinion about what the controlling principles are.'
This paper is less concerned with the particular justifications for proprietary
relief which have been offered than with the general form that any justification
ought to take. Scholarly literature on legal justification tends to focus upon two
Fellow, The Australian Centre for Private Law, The University of Queensland; The author
thanks Professor Ross Grantham, Professor Allan Beever and Associate Professor Matthew
Harding for reading and commenting upon on earlier versions of this paper.
Important contributions to the literature not cited elsewhere is this paper include D
Paciocco, 'The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for Priorities over
Creditors' (1989) 68 Canadian Bar Review 315, Ross Grantham, 'Doctrinal Bases for
the Recognition of Property Rights' (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 561,
Craig Rotherham, 'Proprietary Relief for Enrichment by Wrongs: Some Realism about
Property Talk' (1996) 19 University of New South Wales Law Journal 378, Roy Goode,
'Proprietary Restitutionary Claims' in WR Cornish, Richard Nolan, Janet O'Sullivan and
Graham Virgo (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth
Jones (Hart, Oxford, 1998) 63, Craig Rotherham, 'Restitution and Property Rites: Reason
and Ritual in the Law of Proprietary Remedies' (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law
205, Andrew Burrows, 'Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment' (2001)
117 Law Quarterly Review 412, Lord Millett, 'Proprietary Restitution' in Simone Degeling
and James Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2005) 309,
Andrew D Hicks, 'The Remedial Principle of Keech v Sandford Reconsidered' (2010)
69 Cambridge Law Journal 287, Elise Bant and Michael Bryan, 'Constructive Trusts and
Equitable Proprietary Relief. Rethinking the Essentials' (2011) 5 Journal of Equity 171
and William Swadling, 'The Fiction of the Constructive Trust' (2011) 64 Current Legal
Problems 399.
ways of thinking about justification of entitlements. One mode of reasoning
focuses upon whom, according to a desired pattern of distribution of benefits
and burdens, should be allowed to take the benefit or bear the burden. Where a
proprietary remedy is claimed, the question becomes one of whom, as between
competing claimants to an asset, should be allowed to take the asset. Justification
is a question of distributive justice. Some recent scholarship on proprietary
remedies has attributed a significant role to distributive justice considerations in
the justification of such awards. 2 The other mode of reasoning asks whether the
claimant is entitled to demand that the defendant act in a particular way towards
the claimant. A proprietary remedy is seen to be justified to the extent that it is
right that the defendant should transfer the relevant asset to the claimant - or,
conversely, whether it would be wrong for the defendant to refuse to transfer the
asset to the claimant. Justification is a question of commutative justice.'
This paper attempts to lay some foundations for a purely commutative justice
account of proprietary remedies. Part II of the paper gives an account of the
commutative justice mode of reasoning and its implications for the recognition and
interpretation of legal entitlements. It is argued that commutative justice accounts
and distributive justice accounts are founded upon different assumptions as to what
has to be justified and, consequently, what counts as justification. Consequently,
commutative justice accounts are frequently misunderstood and underestimated
by those whose thinking is framed in distributive terms. Part III of the paper
sketches how proprietary remedies would be justified under a purely commutative
justice account of entitlements. In the author's opinion, a purely commutative
justice account of entitlements is to be preferred to a distributive justice account
because the former type of account will necessarily be a more coherent account
than a distributive justice account.4 Of course, whether a commutative justice
account of entitlements provides a complete account of the legal practice of any
particular community is a distinct question. The immediate aim of this paper is the
fairly modest one of ascertaining what constraints a purely commutative justice
account of entitlements would place upon the forms of argument that may be used
to justify proprietary remedies.
2 Matthew Harding, 'Constructive Trusts and Distributive Justice' in Elise Bant and Michael
Bryan (eds), Principles of Proprietary Remedies (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2013) 19; Elise
Bant and Michael Bryan, 'A Model of Proprietary Remedies' in Elise Bant and Michael
Bryan (eds), Principles of Proprietary Remedies (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2013) 211
3 'Corrective justice' theories are examples of commutative justice accounts of legal
entitlements. The term 'commutative justice' is a more precise description of the mode of
reasoning which is diametrically opposed to distributive justice. The term 'commutative
justice' is used in Ernest J Weinrib, 'Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason' (1987) 87 Columbia
Law Review 472, 495 and Allan Beever, Forgotten Justice: The Forms of Justice in the
History of Legal and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013) 79. Beever has
remarked that the term 'corrective justice' has the unfortunate connotation that it is merely
concerned with 'how to rectify circumstances when one person has committed an injustice
against another' (at 75).
4 For further explanation of the meaning of 'coherence' for this purpose, see below nn 70-71
and accompanying text.
II. COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE ACCOUNTS
According to commutative justice accounts of entitlements, an entitlement is
justified if it is right for the claimant to make a demand of a person and it would be
wrong for that person to refuse to comply with the demand. The ascription of right
and wrong involves an evaluation of the parties' conduct rather than an evaluation
of the distributive effects of giving effect to the entitlement. Commutative
justice accounts of legal entitlements appear in two different guises. These shall,
for convenience, be called the 'constructivist argument' and the 'evolutionary
argument'.
(a) The Constructivist Argument
The accounts of entitlements given by Peter Benson, Ernest Weinrib and Allan
Beever rely upon the constructivist argument. Benson used the term 'constructivist'
to describe an approach in which 'normative categories are themselves worked
out from a standpoint that represents us as fully accountable choosing agents'.'
Benson said that this approach is 'immanent' in responsible agency - that is, in
the notion that individuals are accountable to each other as individuals- so that
the normative categories are 'posited by and expressive of the choosing self in
its capacity for responsible agency'.6 For Benson, this was the correct standpoint
for analysing legal entitlements which emerge from adjudication. Individuals
have entitlements as against other individuals. The latter are liable to the former
on account of their actions as individuals. These commitments presuppose that
individual people are freely choosing agents - that is, people have 'the capacity
to think of oneself, not as concretely determined in this or that way'. Freely
choosing agents are seen to be equal to one another in the sense that 'everything
that is attributed to subjects in virtue of their being personality must be ascribed
equally and identically to each of them' .8 This does not mean that individuals are
taken to be identical in all of their particularities. Obviously, different individuals
have different individual projects and desires. The key point for Benson is that the
content of their particular characteristics and purposes is irrelevant to the working
out of normative categories.
Once the standpoint is established in this way, certain normative categories
emerge. First, there is a distinction to be made between persons and things.
Persons are ends in themselves who choose their own purposes. A thing is said
5 Peter Benson, 'The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice'
(1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 515, 549
6 Ibid 552
7 Ibid 560; See also Ernest J Weinrib, above n 3,483-484 at which Weinrib (relying explicitly
on Kant) spoke of free agency as having two aspects, namely 'free choice (freie Willkur)
as independence from determination by sensuous impulse' and 'practical reason (Wille) as
the determining ground of purposive activity'. Beever (also citing Kant) spoke of human
beings having 'the quality of being their own masters' (Beever, above n 3, 153).
8 Benson, above n 5, 561
to be 'a normative dimension ... whether physical or otherwise ... that contrasts
with the self-relatedness of personality'. 9 Things are external to persons and,
since they are not persons, 'can in principle be treated merely as a means', m
Therefore, it is 'morally possible ' for persons to appropriate things to their own
use. Since persons are equal, this possibility 'belongs equally and identically to
every [person]'. 12 The moral permissibility of appropriating things and using them
cannot depend upon any particular interest or need that a person may have -
because the matter is being considered from a standpoint that is independent of
any such particularity. 3
Secondly, equality between persons implies limitations upon the moral permission
to appropriate things for one's own use. Since every person has an identical moral
permission to appropriate things to her own use, every person is required to
respect each other person's freedom to use things. Benson explained the point in
the following way:-
I cannot rightly view the subordination of a thing to another's will as
nothing more than a particular determination which I may choose to
negate. This is because it represents the other's will and decision, and
if I interfere with it, my doing so is not, taken in itself, expressive of the
other's independence. On the contrary, from the other's standpoint, such
interference counts as an external imposition that restricts his or her will.
By impinging on it without the other's consent, I can affect his or her
capacity to use things.' 4
At this point, an account of correlative rights and obligations between two persons
has become possible. Respect is owed by each person to each other person in
relation to the things which the other has appropriated to her use. Rights and
obligations exist in the context of a relationship between two interacting people,
so the norms contemplated by Benson are necessarily associated with bipolar
relationships:-
[W]here interaction involves more than two individuals, it must be
possible, for the purposes of normative evaluation, to conceptualize it
either as reducible in fact to a two-person relationship or as comprising
a number of distinct two-person relationships, each of which must
satisfy the requirement of respect. The two-person relationship always
9 Ibid 563
10 Ibid; See also Ernest J Weinrib, 'The Juridical Classification of Obligations' in Peter Birks
(ed), The Classification of Obligations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 37, 45 where
Weinrib said that things 'can serve as means because they lack the capacity for self-
determining agency'.
11 Benson, above n 5, 563
12 Ibid 564
13 Ibid
14 Ibid 568
constitutes, normatively speaking, the relevant unit of analysis. 5
An insistence that the two person relationship is the relevant unit of analysis
is essential to a commutative justice account, but that feature alone does not
distinguish commutative justice accounts from distributive justice accounts.
Matthew Harding has suggested that 'norms of distributive justice are contingently
bipolar because, as a matter of fact, the grounds for allocation that they specify
happen to implicate only two parties as potential objects of allocation' and that
it is contingently bipolar norms of distributive justice that are 'at large' in some
of the cases in which proprietary remedies are awarded.' 6 A somewhat stronger
affirmation of the centrality of correlativity between a defendant's liability and the
claimant's entitlement to private law adjudication is found in the work of Hanoch
Dagan:- '7
Correlativity is crucial for private law because private law adjudication
... is a coercive mechanism run by unelected officials and, therefore,
must be a justificatory practice. To be a justificatory practice, private
law adjudication must be able to justify to the defendant each and every
aspect of its state mandated power. In particular ... private law needs to
be able to justify to the defendant both the identity of the recipient of any
detriment imposed on her and the exact benefit this recipient receives.
The correlativity thesis answers exactly this concern by insisting
that the defendant's liability and remedy correspond to the plaintiff's
entitlement.'
Nevertheless, for Dagan, the law's choice as to the measure and form of a claimant's
entitlement and a defendant's liability involves distributive considerations. These
are not considerations of society's goals for the distribution of benefits and burdens
across society as a whole but considerations which arise from 'the social vision
respecting the parties' relationship'. 9 Accordingly, the relationship between two
individuals is viewed as an instantiation of a type of relationship - for example,
a marriage20 - in respect of which the community has a collective view about the
ideal distribution of benefits and burdens.
15 Benson, above n 5, 569; See also Ernest J Weinrib, 'The Structure of Unjustness' (2012)
92 Boston University Law Review 1067, 1067-1068, in which Weinrib said that corrective
justice insists 'that liability be based on normative considerations that embrace both parties
in relation to each other' (italics added).
16 Harding, above n 2, 25 (italics added)
17 Hanoch Dagan, 'The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice' (1999) 98 Michigan
Law Review 138
18 Ibid 150-151
19 Ibid 153
20 Hanoch Dagan, 'The Limited Autonomy of Private Law' (2008) 56 American Journal of
Comparative Law 809, 820-821, in which Dagan argued that understanding equal division
as a rule of marital property law 'requires us to articulate an ideal conception for the
institution of marriage'.
The critical distinction between the commutative justice accounts and the
distributive justice accounts does not relate to the number of people under
consideration. Instead, it relates to what has to be justified as between the parties
to a two party relationship. Distributive justice accounts focus upon the allocation
of benefits and burdens between the parties as the matter to be justified, while
commutative justice accounts ask whether and to what extent one party is justified
in demanding a restriction of the choices of the other party. This becomes clear
when the accounts of property rights offered by Dagan and Harding are compared
with the account offered by Benson.
Dagan's distributive justice account assumes that, since any setting of entitlements
will have distributive effects, the justificatory enquiry in the adjudicative setting
is necessarily a matter of justifying those distributive effects. In relation to
property rights, 'each additional stick, and any expansion of any existing stick,
in the owner's bundle of rights, is ipso facto a burden on non-owners'. 2' Since
property rights can be configured in a multiplicity of ways, the choice as to the
configuration of any person's property right is 'implicated in- and is a construction
of - social values' .22 Dagan has made it clear that he does not envisage that 'in
evaluating individual cases judges should made ad hoc judgments based on
[social] values' .23 Moreover, a private law plaintiff is required 'to give reasons
why people in her predicament should be entitled to extract from people in the
defendant ' category the kind of remedy she now requires'. 24 Nevertheless, Dagan
recognised that values reflect 'our contingent reality' 25 and envisaged a constant
re-examination of the received rules. Bringing private law's reliance on social
values to our attention was said to help us 'realise that in order to validate our
current practices we need to justify these conventional values' .26 It is clear that
Dagan contemplated an ongoing process of justification of the rules which define
legal entitlements in the light of contemporary values, so that adjudicators acted as
agents of the community as a whole in evaluating whether historical constructions
of legal entitlements continued to be justified in the light of the contemporary
community's values concerning the relationship in question.27
Harding's account, like Dagan's, regards the recognition of property rights as
necessarily allocative. Harding began with the proposition that 'norms of justice'
are 'ought-propositions specifying that grounds for an allocation of some benefit
21 Ibid 149
22 Ibid
23 HanochDagan, 'The Public Dimensions of Private Property' (2013) 24 Kings Law
Journal 260, 271
24 Ibid (italics added)
25 Ibid
26 Ibid 272
27 See also Steve Hedley, 'Courts as public authorities, private law as instrument of
government' in Kit Barker and Darryn Jensen (eds), Private Law: Key Encounters with
Public Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) 89. Hedley asserts that courts
are 'public authorities' (at 89) and that, as public officials, 'they should be improving what
they do as part of the ordinary process of doing it' (at 93).
or burden as between competing (or potentially competing) claimants'. 28 Some
norms ofjustice express what Harding calls 'corrective justice' and others express
distributive justice, but both are ultimately concerned with allocations of benefits
and burdens. Corrective justice norms and distributive justice norms differinterms
of (1) the number of parties among whom the allocation is made and (2) the type
of justification for the making of the allocation. For Harding, corrective justice is
always concerned with an allocation between claimant and defendant only. The
reason for the allocation is 'an impugned transaction between the plaintiff and the
defendant'. 29 An allocation is justified and necessary in so far as the effect of the
impugned transaction was to pass the benefit from claimant to defendant, deprive
the plaintiff of the benefit or to divert the benefit which was 'due to the plaintiff'
from the plaintiff to the defendant.3 0 Clearly, for Harding, a re-conveyance of an
asset which had been transferred by the claimant to the defendant by mistake is an
allocation justified by a norm of corrective justice. Such an allocation cancels the
impugned transaction.3' Harding suggested that norms of distributive justice are
'default norms of justice', in the sense that the allocations that are not concerned
with cancelling the effects of an impugned transaction are to be justified (if at all)
by norms of distributive justice.3 2
For Benson, an allocation of things could not be the starting point for the law of
property because an allocation presupposes that someone has previously acquired
the capacity and the right to allocate the things which are available for allocation.
A distributive justice account of the origins of property rights would have to take
common ownership as its starting point: -
[T]he members of a distribution must initially be viewed as mutually
related through a social whole with benefits and burdens being construed
in some appropriate way as common or collective. Absent this form of
mutual relatedness, a basis for analysis in terms of distributive justice is
lacking.... [T]here is no notion here of a social whole (whether viewed
as a system of cooperation or otherwise) in which persons are mutually
related through common claims or burdens. What persons 'share' in
abstract right is simply an identical permission to use things to the
exclusion of others. 33
28 Harding, above n 2, 20 (italics added)
29 Ibid
30 Ibid 21; Harding, in defining corrective justice in this way, relies heavily on some recent
works of John Gardner, notably John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford University
Press, 2012) Chapter 10 and John Gardner, 'What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of
Corrective Justice' (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1, 6-17. It should be noted that this
is a narrower conception of corrective justice than that adopted by Ernest Weinrib and
Peter Benson. Beever has remarked that Gardner's definition ofjustice as norms relating to
allocative questions 'guarantees that commutative justice will be misunderstood' (Beever,
above n 3, 285).
31 Ibid
32 Ibid 25
33 Ibid
Here, it becomes clear that the commutative justice focus onjustifying restrictions
on a person's choices and the distributive justice focus upon allocation have their
foundations in different hypotheses about the relationship between the law and
the state. Distributive justice accounts assume that entitlements are the product
of an original allocation by an authority which had the capacity to perform such
an allocation on behalf of the community as a whole. Thereafter, the question
becomes whether the chosen basis for distribution continues to reflect the
community's values. The state is understood to be the author of all entitlements
and, through the agency of the courts of law, engaged in a continual re-evaluation
and recalibration of those entitlements. The 'state-mandated power' of the courts
is understood as a power to allocate benefits and burdens and it is the allocative
effect of adjudications that has to be justified.
The commutative justice accounts look upon the state as a body which has come
into existence to secure individual entitlements, the intelligibility of which is
anterior to the state. Beever has developed this theme at length, tracing it through
the thought of Aristotle, Aquinas, Pufendorf and Kant.34 The critical point is that
the intelligibility of entitlements does not depend upon the existence of the state.
The state comes into existence so as to secure those entitlementsfor all in a more
orderly and effective fashion than individuals could secure them for themselves.
Weinrib has explained the matter in Kantian terms:-
The state of nature is a device for exhibiting the range of rights whose
structure and content are normatively intelligible even apart from the
public institutions that make them effective. In contrast, 'public right'
refers to a condition in which public institutions actualize and guarantee
these rights.
Kant posits the state of nature in order to show that public right is
necessary to cure its inadequacies. Although the rights in the state of
nature are correlatively structured in order to be fair to both parties, the
absence of a public mechanism of correction means that the interpretation
and enforcement of these rights is left to the unilateral will of the stronger
party.35
Benson, also drawing on Kant, has remarked that '[t]he moral possibility of
coercion is not attached to the obligation as an addition that is justified on distinct
ground' but 'constitutes an essential defining feature of the obligation itself'. 36 For
Beever, Weinrib and Benson, it is the effectiveness and the regularity of coercion
- not the moral possibility of coercion - that depends upon the existence of the
state and its institutions.
34 Beever, above n 5, 84-85 (Aristotle), 114-115 (Aquinas), 148-149 (Pufendorf), 163-164
(Kant)
35 Ernest J Weinrib, 'Public Law and Private Right' (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law
Journal 191, 195
36 Benson, above n 5, 577
There are two observations to be made in concluding this section. The first
observation is that the fact that the recognition of an entitlement has certain effects
does not necessarily point to an intention or rationale that the recognition of the
entitlement should have those effects. It has been noted that the commutative
justice justification of particular entitlements is a matter of whether individuals
are justified in making particular types of demands of other individuals and
not a matter of whether the state is justified in allocating benefits and burdens
in a particular way. Entitlements are rationalised without referring to their
distributive effects. From the perspective of the commutative justice accounts, the
distributive justice accounts make the error of assuming that, since entitlements
have distributive effects, those entitlements have to be rationalised in terms of
those effects. Lionel Smith 7 has pointed to a version of this error in the course of
commenting upon the use of deterrence to explain legal entitlements:-
Some people may be deterred from punching me because of a fear of
liability. We might therefore say that my right to bodily integrity has the
effect of operating as a deterrent in relation to some people. But it would
be slightly ridiculous to suggest that my right to bodily integrity arises in
order to deter, or has a deterrent function. It is a fundamental right arising
from our common humanity.38
Explaining any entitlement in terms of a rationale of deterrence presupposes
that there is a separate reason for thinking that that which is to be deterred is
undesirable. Since conduct which is to be deterred can be characterised as bad or
wrong - and, accordingly, something to be deterred - coercing persons to refrain
from engaging in that conduct is justified whether the prospect of coercion has
a deterrent effect or not. Deterrence has no role to play in providing a rationale
for the entitlement to coerce another. The broader point is that beneficial effects -
whether in terms of deterrence or distribution - are 'positive externalities'.3" One
cannot assume that the entitlement was recognised in order to have those effects.
The second observation concerns the need to distinguish the commutative justice
order, created by interactions and made explicit in the course of adjudication of
disputes, from the co-existing legislative order. As Beever has explained, the
notion that property rights exist independently of the state 'does not imply that
property rights are inviolable or mean that the state is incapable of adjusting
property holdings for the sake of the common good'.40 The argument concerns the
origins of rights rather than 'their normative strength vis-h-vis other concerns'."
A state might, on distributive justice grounds, alter pre-existing rights in large
37 Lionel Smith, 'Deterrence, prophylaxis and punishment in fiduciary obligations' (2013) 7
Journal of Equity 87
38 Ibid
39 Allan Beever, 'Formalism in Music and the Law' (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law
Journal 213, 234
40 Beever, above n 3,114
41 Ibid
or small ways. It can be acknowledged that there are some 'obvious statutory
Leviathans ... whose aims and objectives must be given full weight'42 and which
have reshaped the pre-existing entitlements in significant ways. It is not denied
that an accurate picture of contemporary private law must acknowledge the role
of legislation in reshaping entitlements. 43 Equally, it is not denied that distributive
justice concerns have a role in the political forum and that the products of the
political process are often to be understood in terms of their distributive motives.
What is questioned by these commutative justice accounts is the attribution of
distributive justice rationales to what is left of the pre-existing entitlements after
the legislature has done its work. There is not one order, but two contiguous orders
each of which is to be understood on its own terms.
(b) The Evolutionary Argument
While the constructivist argument takes many of its cues from Immanuel Kant,
the evolutionary argument owes much to the thought of David Hume. Hume
spoke of the origin of property rights in terms of 'a convention entered into by all
the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external
goods' .44 The 'convention' is not to be understood as an historical agreement:-
[This convention] is only a general sense of common interest; which
sense all the members of society express to one another, and which
induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it
will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods,
provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me.45
A rule 'arises gradually' and 'acquires force by a slow progression'. 46 It is
reinforced 'by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing
it'.47 Significantly, for the current discussion, Hume insisted that such conventions
provide the foundations for the idea of justice:-
After this convention, concerning abstinence from the possessions
of others, is entered into, and every one has acquired a stability in his
possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice;
as also those of property, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether
unintelligible, without first understanding the former. Our property is
nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is established by the
42 Bant and Bryan, above n 2, 226. These Australian authors mention the Torrens statutes and
the Australian Consumer Law.
43 See Kit Barker, 'Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law' in Barker and Jensen,
above n 27, 5-6
44 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (ed A Selby-Bigge)(Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1896) 489 [Book III, Part 11, Section II - 'Of the origin of justice and property']
45 Ibid 490
46 Ibid
47 Ibid
laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice. 4t
The relationship between law and justice contemplated by Hume was not
functionalist in character- that is, law was not understood as an instrument which
had been designed to do justice. The 'same artifice' gave rise to both justice and
property.49 Moreover, Hume's conception of justice was non-distributive. Hume
was concerned with each person's obligation to abstain from interfering with each
other person and each other person's possessions. The central idea is commutative
justice.
The foremost recent exponent of the evolutionary argument was the Austrian-
born economist and historian of ideas, Friedrich Hayek. Hayek's central concern
was the problem of knowledge or, more precisely, 'the impossibility for anyone
of knowing all the particular facts on which the overall order of the activities in
a Great Society is based'.5 0 Hayek understood rules as an 'adaptation' 5' to the
problem of uncertainty: -
Man has developed rules of conduct not because he knows but because
he does not know what the consequences of a particular action will be.
And the most characteristic feature of morals and law as we know them
is therefore that they consist of rules to be obeyed irrespective of the
known effects of the particular action. ... [T]here would be no need for
rules if men knew everything - and strict act-utilitarianism of course
must lead to the rejection of all rules.52
Hayek spoke of rules of conduct. Such rules identify correct modes of conduct
for individuals. They were not designed to produce desirable effects and the
obligation to obey is not conditional upon the effects of obedience in particular
cases. The rules of conduct express commutative justice. These rules 'delimit
protected domains not by directly assigning particular things to particular persons,
but by making it possible to derive from ascertainable facts to whom particular
things belong' . They 'do not confer rights on particular person, but lay down the
conditions under which such rights can be acquired' .14
In Hayek's thought, there is a link between the adoption of rules and the beneficial
effects of obeying those rules, but the link has nothing to do with those beneficial
effects being foreseen and intended. Hayek stated that 'rules serve because they
have become adapted to the solution of recurring problem situations and thereby
48 Ibid 490-491
49 Ibid 491
50 FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Volume 11: The Mirage of Social Justice)
(Routledge Kegan and Paul, London, 1982) 8
51 Ibid 39
52 Ibid 20-21
53 Ibid 37
54 Ibid 38
help to make the members of the society in which they prevail more effective in
the pursuit of their aims'. 5 The process by which rles emerge was described by
Hayekvariously as'social evolution',56 'evolutionary selection'5 and'spontaneous
order'." Whatever label might have been given to it at different times, the core
idea remained the same. Rules are not adopted because the state foresaw that the
general observance of particular rules would produce beneficial effects. Certain
modes of conduct gradually become generally observed rules because people
who adopt those modes of conduct find that the observance of those modes of
conduct as rules solves certain types of coordination problems that exist within
their community and, consequentially, the community survives and prospers. The
observance of the modes of conduct which are most successful in overcoming
coordination problems will gradually extend to larger and larger groups of people
simply because the groups which observe those modes of conduct will 'prevail
over others' or 'expand at the expense of others'.59 The members of a community
need not know which particular modes of conduct are the causes of their success.
The observance of the set of rules followed by successful groups is reinforced
within those groups (and expands to include others) because the groups which
observe those rules survive and prosper.60 Since nobody designed the rules to have
the effects that they have, the idea that any particular rule might be just or unjust
in its effects has no place in a spontaneous order.6' That is a judgment which refers
to criteria which are extrinsic to the order. It is a matter for political judgement
rather than legal interpretation.
Under Hayek's evolutionary argument, entitlements exist because rules of
conduct mark out 'domains of free action' 62 for individuals. A person is, in respect
of things which fall within those domains, justified in saying to others 'keep off'
or 'do not interfere'. Accordingly, Hayek's evolutionary argument aligns with the
constructivist argument in insisting that private law entitlements are 'normatively
intelligible' 63 in the absence of the apparatus of the state and that those entitlements
are particularisations of commutative justice. In so far as private law is the
55 Jbid 21
56 Ibid 22
57 FA Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1989) 6
58 FA Hayek, 'The Confusion of Language in Political Thought' in FA Hayek, New Studies
in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (Routledge Kegan and Paul,
London, 1978) 71, 79
59 FA Hayek, 'The Errors of Constructivism' in Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy etc,
above n 58, 3, 9
60 Ibid 10; See also Hayek, above n 50, 21, Hayek, above n 57, 70 and FA Hayek, Law,
Legislation and Liberty (Volume I: Rules and Order)(Routledge Kegan and Paul, London,
1982)('Rules and Order') 99
61 Note, in this connection, Hayek's comment that '[s]trictly speaking, only human conduct
can be called just or unjust' and that, in relation to a state of affairs, those terms 'have
meaning only in so far as we hold someone responsible for bringing it about or allowing it
to come about'. (Hayek, above n 50, 31)
62 Hayek, 'Rules and Order', above n 60, 107
63 See note 35 above
manifestation of spontaneous order, public law 'merely organises the apparatus
required for the better functioning of that more comprehensive spontaneous order'
and amounts to 'a sort of superstructure erected primarily to protect a pre-existing
spontaneous order and to enforce the rules on which it rests'.64
(c) Consequences for Legal Interpretation
Commutative justice accounts reject the notion that entitlements are designed with
distributive goals or effects in mind. From this it follows that the consideration
of distributive goals and effects ought not to play any role in the recognition
and interpretation of entitlements. Moreover, the recognition and interpretation
of entitlements in the adjudicative forum is seen as something altogether distinct
from the evaluation, criticism and recalibration of entitlements in the political
forum.65 The commutative justice accounts maintain that the arguments proposed
in the adjudicative forum in favour of enlarging or limiting the scope of an
entitlement must be arguments that it is right for the claimant to demand that the
defendant's freedom of action be restricted in a particular way and it would be
wrong for the defendant to refuse to abide by the restriction.
The commutative justice accounts do not claim that a universal and comprehensive
set of legal norms may be deduced from the commutative justice idea. Weinrib,
for example, has stated that the forms of justice have a 'historical universality'
but 'their manifestations in a legal system are relative to a set of public meanings
that obtain at a given time and place'.66 This concentration on the forms of justice
'requires only that whatever mode of ordering a jurisdiction adopts conform
[sic] to the rationality immanent in that mode of ordering'.6 In other words, in a
legal system in which entitlements are defined in the context of disputes between
particular claimants and defendants, any justification offered for requiring that DI
give x to C1 must be an argument that giving x to C1 would be the right conduct
for Di to adopt towards C. A variety of particular arguments on the point are
admissible. What is not admissible is any argument that D, giving x to C1 would
have a desirable distributive effect or would otherwise further social goals. Of
course, what is right as between C1 and D1 must also be right for all other pairs of
persons in materially identical situations but, as Beever has pointed out, this is the
product of analogy between the situations of different pairs of persons rather than
of consideration of what is good for persons generally.68
64 Hayek, above n 58, 79
65 See also Ernest J Weinrib, 'Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law'
(1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 949, 973 at which Weinrib states that his objection to 'loss-
spreading' as an explanation of tort law is an objectionto 'the linkage of loss-spreading and
adjudication'. See also Lon L Fuller, 'Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms
- A Review of Robert L Hale's "Freedom through Law" (1954) 54 Columbia Law Review
70, 81.
66 Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,
1995) 228
67 Ibid
68 Beever, above n 3, 80; Compare Peter Cane's suggestion that '[i]t is because rules of tort
Since, as Weinrib acknowledged, it is possible that commutative justice may have
been given different 'public meanings' at different places and times, the starting
point for any exercise in interpretation must be the particular public meanings
in the relevant jurisdiction rather than the abstract concept of commutative
justice. In other words, an argument must, in addition to expressing commutative
justice as between the parties to the dispute, fit within the network of previous
instantiations of commutative justice in the relevant jurisdiction. For Weinrib,
then, the process of interpretation is neither wholly deductive - from the concept
of commutative justice - nor wholly inductive - from the sequence of adjudicative
acts. Commutative justice is understood to be the most abstract conceptualisation
of the rationality that is immanent in the sequence of adjudicative acts. In saying
that coherence is the 'criterion of truth', 69 Weinrib was suggesting that the best
interpretation of a practice is that which presents the practice as something
which is systematic and unified. Commutative justice provides the best available
hypothesis of a common 'supportive structure'10 for the practice being interpreted.
Moreover, where a commutative justice explanation provides a plausible account
of a community's legal practice, it provides a more coherent account of that
practice than a distributive justice account could. A plurality of considerations
could be relevant to any allocation of benefit or burden, so trade-offs between
considerations have to be performed. The distributive considerations will not
themselves determine what trade-offs need to be performed. What is distributively
just is a matter of compromise between competing criteria rather than one of
common supportive structure. 7 1
Systematicity and coherence were as important for Hayek as they are for Weinrib.
Hayek spoke of an 'immanent criticism' which 'moves within a given system of
rules and judges particular rules in terms of their consistency or compatibility
with all other recognized rules in inducing the formation of a certain kind of order
of actions'. 72 Interpretation in the adjudicative context is 'conservative' 73 in the
sense that the standard for evaluation of any interpretation has to be those parts
of the system of rules which are not in doubt. It may seem at first that the test
of the validity of an interpretation is simply lack of contradiction of established
interpretations, but this cannot be so. Hayek's emphasis upon 'order' and 'system'
liability allocate various risks of harm and obligations to repair harm as between various
classes of persons that they can be treated as falling within the province of distributive
justice' (Peter Cane, 'Distributive Justice and Tort Law' [2001] New Zealand Law Review
401, 412-413 (italics added)).
69 Ernest J Weinrib, above n 65, 972
70 A set of propositions may be said to be coherent to the extent that they share the same
'supportive structure'. See Robert Alexy and Aleksander Peczenik, 'The Concept of
Coherence and its Significance for Discursive Rationality' (1990) 2 Ratio Juris 130, 131.
71 As Weinrib has explained, '[t]he formalist assumes that ajuridically intelligible relationship
cannot consist in an aggregate of conceptually disjunct or inconsistent elements that, like a
pile of pebbles, happen to be juxtaposed' (Weinrib, above n 65, 968).
72 Hayek, above n 50, 24
73 FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Volume I: Rules and Order)(Routledge Kegan
and Paul, London, 1982) 120
demands the ranking of propositions, in which lower-ranked propositions are seen
to be instantiations of higher-ranked propositions. Hayek, in expressing substantial
agreement with an early version of Ronald Dworkin's theory, affirmed that 'the
law is a system (and not a mere collection) of (articulated and unarticulated)
rules'.74 Hayek said that, by 'system', he meant 'a body of rules that are mutually
adjusted to each other and possess an order of rank' .71 Accordingly, the test of
the validity of an interpretation must be that it can be seen as an instantiation of a
more general proposition which explains a larger part of the practice.
Once it is recognised that interpretations of small parts of the practice stand to be
tested against higher-ranked propositions explaining large parts of the practice, it
becomes apparent that there are situations in which interpretation takes a critical
stance. Established interpretations can be questioned:-
It may at first seem puzzling that something that is the product of
tradition should be capable of both being the object and the standard of
criticism. But we do not maintain that all tradition as such is sacred and
exempt from criticism, but merely that the basis of criticism of any one
product of tradition must always be other products of tradition which we
either cannot or do not want to question; in other words, that particular
aspects of a culture can be critically examined only within the context
of that culture .76
This approach to interpretation - by which every interpretation has to express or
refer to a rule of just conduct 77 - proceeds on the basis that commutative justice
is the abstract principle which underpins the entire body of interpretation. Every
element of the practice is taken to be a particularisation of commutative justice.
Commutative justice is the key to understanding the practice as a coherent and
systematic practice and, therefore, the basis for evaluation and criticism of
particular parts of the practice.
An important consequence of the emphasis upon systematicity in both Weinrib's
and Hayek's accounts of adjudication is that interpretation of the practice of
adjudication proceeds on the assumption that the previous decisions of the courts
- or the overwhelming majority of them, at least - are correct. What is not assumed
is that the verbal formulae used to justify decisions in individual cases always
constitute the best possible explanations for the decisions in those cases. This is a
74 Hayek, above 50, 34 (footnote 4)
75 Ibid
76 Hayek, above n 50, 25
77 Ibid 34-35; Hayek pointed out that the law contains many rules which are not, strictly
speaking, rules of just conduct but which 'define by separate rules [those] states of affairs
to which particular rules of conduct refer'. An obvious example of such a rule is the
requirement that contracts are not enforceable in the absence of consideration passing from
the promisee to the promisor. Such a rule defines (in part) the state of affairs in which one
person has an obligation to perform its contractual undertaking to another.
plausible account of common law adjudicative practice which has been endorsed
by others. Peter Jaffey has said that '[t]he fundamental constraint the court is
under is to conform to previous decisions on the facts, not to apply exclusionary
rules previously laid down, and rules are built up by analogical reasoning on the
basis of this constraint'.78 Accordingly, the verbal form of a rule laid down by
a court is always 'provisional'. 79 Of course, explanations which have become
widely accepted are not to be dismissed lightly. Emily Sherwin has said that 'if the
pattern of the decisions and the remarks of the judges who decided them suggest
a common idea, that idea is worth attending to because it represents the collective
reasoning of a number of judges over time',80 While ideas running through cases
could be mistaken, 'the epistemic advantage lies with an idea or principle that has
been developed and accepted collectively over time'.,, The difference between
Jaffey and Sherwin on this point is merely a difference of emphasis. Both Jaffey
and Sherwin have emphasised the controlling function of abstract ideas, as opposed
to verbal formulae, which explain large numbers of decisions. The explanations
offered by judges in particular cases are relevant data for the purpose of identifying
those abstract ideas. At the same time, arguments and explanations are evaluated
in the light of the abstract ideas. This evaluation will not usually refer directly
to the most abstract principle of the system, namely that of commutative justice.
It will usually refer to the more particular forms of commutative justice that are
pervasive in the previous adjudicative practice. Aberrant forms of justification,
which should not be adopted by subsequent courts, identify themselves by their
lack of reference to those more abstract ideas. One might say that, by way of 'a
series of repetitions around a self-contained system', a group of laws 'assumes its
optimal, most evolved form' .8 2
III. COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE AND PROPRIETARY REMEDIES
The generic question posed by the principle of commutative justice is a question
of whether it is right for the claimant to demand that the defendant's freedom of
action be restricted in a particular way. Where a proprietary remedy is claimed,
that question becomes a question about whether it is right for the claimant to
demand an immediate transfer of a particular asset or interest in an asset from
the defendant and, conversely, it would be wrong for the defendant to refuse
to make the transfer. It is not a question of which of two (or more) parties is
more deserving of the asset. This is the first and most important consequence
of embracing the commutative justice accounts. A second consequence is that
78 Peter Jaffey, 'Authority in the Common Law' (2011) 36 Australian Journal of Legal
Philosophy 1, 21 (italics added)
79 Ibid
80 Emily Sherwin, 'A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law' (1999) 66 The University of
Chicago Law Review 1179, 1189 (italics added)
81 Ibid
82 Richard Sutton, 'Restitution and the Discourse of System; in Charles Rickett and Ross
Grantham (eds), Structure and Justification of Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford,
2008) 127
whether the defendant must transfer the asset to the claimant is a question
which is to be resolved independently of any consideration of the defendant's
insolvency and the consequence that the claimant would obtain an advantage over
other creditors of the defendant. A third consequence is that all cases are to be
understood as two party cases - or, to state the matter more precisely, multiple
party cases are to be understood as conglomerations of several two party cases.
Each of these consequences is discussed in greater detail below.
(a) A Question of Right Action
Harding has suggested that, when a vendor under a contract for the sale of land
is said to be a constructive trustee for the purchaser, the court is carrying out an
allocation on the basis of a norm of distributive justice:-
The most plausible interpretation of such cases is that in them a court
must allocate a benefit as between the plaintiff and the defendant, thus
raising a question of justice, and that the intention of one or more of
the parties is specified as a ground for that allocation, an allocation that
takes the form of division of the benefit as between the plaintiff and the
defendant as opposed to the subtraction of the benefit from the defendant
and its addition to the plaintiff. 3
In such a case, it is supposed that the parties' contractual intentions provide
the ground for an allocation of property rights in the purchaser's favour. The
requirement of valuable consideration is understood by Harding as an example
of a condition 'whose justification most likely relates to an instrumental concern
for the integrity of the social practice of contracting and for the formalities
attaching to dealings in land'. 4 In any event, since the parties' intentions are
taken to justify one person's conferral of a new right upon the other person - as
opposed to a transfer back of something to which the other person previously had
an entitlement - the justifying norm cannot, according to Harding's reasoning, be
a norm of corrective justice. For Harding, any norm ofjustice which is not a norm
of corrective justice, understood in this narrow sense of justifying a 'giving back'
- is taken to be a norm of distributive justice.85
If, on the other hand, private law entitlements are seen to be grounded in
commutative justice, the most plausible interpretation of the vendor-purchaser
constructive trust is that the terms of the contract provide the purchaser with a
justification for demanding that the vendor transfer the title to the land to the
83 Harding, above n 2, 26; See also Matthew Harding, 'The Limits of Equity in Disputes
over Family Assets' in Jamie Glister and Pauline Ridge (eds), Fault Lines in Equity (Hart,
Oxford, 2012) 193, 202-203, in which Harding describes family assets decided onthe basis
of the parties' common intention as 'distributions of property in accordance with a limited
set of relevant norms'.
84 Harding, above n 2, 26-27
85 See above nn 31-32 and accompanying text.
purchaser on the completion date and, in the meantime, deal with the land only in
ways which are consistent with the performance of the contractual undertaking.
To fail to perform the contractual undertaking is to treat the purchaser as less than
her equal - that is, as a means only and not as an end. This idea was encapsulated
in Kant's statement that 'what I acquire directly by a contract is not an external
thing but rather [the promisor's] deed, by which that thing is brought under my
control so that I make it mine' .86 The vendor's refusal to transfer title is a use of the
vendor's freedom which is 'a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal
laws (i.e. wrong)' so that 'coercion this is opposed to this (as a hindering or a
hindrance to freedom) is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal
laws, that is, it is right' .87
For there to be a constructive trust as a matter of commutative justice, there must
be a reason why vendor ought to transfer the asset - as opposed to a monetary
substitute for the asset - to the purchaser. The nature of the asset which is being
bought and sold will often provide such a reason. It is trite law that, where a near
substitute for the undelivered thing is readily available, the vendor is obliged only
to pay damages in respect of the purchaser's loss caused by the failure to deliver88
- so the vendor has the freedom not to transfer the thing which it has undertaken
to transfer. Where it can reasonably be inferred that it is an essential element of
the parties' agreement that a particular asset be transferred - for example, where
the asset is an identified block of land, a particular painting by Rembrandt or items
which are infrequently traded in an open market89 - the claimant's entitlement is
not fulfilled by payment of the cost of acquiring a similar item from elsewhere,
because no similar item is readily available. Payment of the monetary value of the
entitlement is not adequate to ensure that the defendant does what is right towards
the claimant. Where the asset which is being bought and sold is not of this type,
a monetary substitute for literal performance of the contract - in other words,
damages in the expectation measure - is an adequate remedy. Such an approach
can be seen as an outworking of the common law's commitment, when presented
with alternative means of giving effect to a claimant's right, to preferring the
remedy which is the lesser interference with the defendant's freedom.90
86 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, (translated by Mary Gregor)(Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1996) [6:274] (Part I, Chapter II, Section II, 'On Contract
Right')
87 Ibid [6:23 1] ('Introduction to the Doctrine of Right')(italics in original)
88 'The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of
contract, he is, for far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect
to damages, as if the contract had been performed.' (Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850;
154 ER 363, 365); See also The Commonwealth v Amman Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174
CLR 64, 80-82 (Mason CJ and Dawson J), 98-99 (Brennan J).
89 One of the leading Australian cases, Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142, concerned the sale
of a taxi cab licence.
90 For a discussion of Anglo-Australian law's preference for the lesser interference, see Dori
Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (Hart, Oxford,
2003) 102-104
The notion that a particular allocation of resources has to be justified is completely
absent from this mode of reasoning. What has to be justified is the purchaser's
insistence that the vendor's freedom be restricted in a particular way - that is, that
the vendor not be free to deal with the asset in any way she chooses. Of course,
restricting the vendor's freedom to deal with the land has the effect of allocating
resources in a particular way but it is not the rationale of the restriction to allocate
resources. The rationale is to ensure that the vendor does what is right towards
the purchaser.
Harding's discussion of disgorgement remedies for breach of fiduciary duty
was, likewise, influenced by an attribution of allocative rationale on the basis of
allocative effect. Where a fiduciary's profits consist of non-diverted gains - that is,
gains that 'far from having a duty to make for the plaintiff, she ought not to have
made at all in the absence of authorisation from the plaintiff' 9 - disgorgement
does not involve giving to the principal something that would have belonged to
her had the fiduciary performed his duty. Therefore, for Harding, the allocation of
the profit to the principal could not be informed by a norm of corrective justice.92 A
consequence of Harding's focus upon the allocation of the profit to the principal is
that disgorgement of diverted gains is justified differently from the disgorgement
of non-diverted gains:-
[I]n cases where assets or opportunities are misappropriated or diverted
from the plaintiff to the defendant in breach of duty, disgorgement is best
understood, by analogy with restitution in cases of unjust enrichment, in
terms of... "allocation back" by subtractive and additive means in order
to cancel the impugned transaction; in these cases, disgorgement restores
to the plaintiff what was due to her but has been gained by the defendant
in breach of duty.93
Put simply, diverted gains cases are to be seen as cases of returning misappropriated
resources and only non-diverted gains cases are truly cases of disgorgement. It is
thought that, since the primary duty of the fiduciary in the latter case was not
to make the profit at all and the principal had no antecedent entitlement to that
profit, norms of distributive justice are needed to justify giving the profit to the
principal once the fiduciary has disgorged it. Harding suggested that the relevant
considerations might include 'the value of economic relationships in which assets
are entrusted to some for the benefit of others, the value of trusting interpersonal
relationships and guaranteeing the trustworthiness of trustees and fiduciaries, and
moral injunctions against using other people'. 94
91 Harding, above n 2, 32
92 Ibid 32-33
93 Ibid 32
94 Ibid 34
A commutative justice account of disgorgement of profits, by contrast, focuses
upon the fiduciary's wrongful use of the freedom that she has been given to
manage the principal's affairs. Paul Miller95 has recently provided such an
account. According to Miller, the 'normative significance' of fiduciary power
relates to its legitimation of 'a limited form of substitution of legal personality'. 96
Moreover, the exercise of fiduciary power is discretionary. It is 'not subject to
- and, in some cases, is not susceptible of- dictation' .97 The fiduciary is given
the freedom to determine how the interests of her principal will be advanced
and, hence, the freedom to manipulate the situation to her own advantage. Such
manipulation cannot be allowed because the fiduciary power involves the exercise
of a legal capacity which belongs to the principal. 98 Instead of imposing upon
the fiduciary an affirmative obligation to serve the best interests of the principal,
the law imposes the so-called conflict rules which 'proscribe appropriation by
the fiduciary of fiduciary power understood as means belonging exclusively to
the beneficiary'. 99 A breach of fiduciary duty can be said to be a wrongful use
of freedom because 'the fiduciary has treated fiduciary power as a means at his
disposal and, in doing so, has violated the beneficiary's exclusive claim upon the
disposition of her means'. 100
For Miller, since a fiduciary's use of the fiduciary power to make a personal
profit would involve treating a means belonging to the principal as her own,
the principal must have a right that the fiduciary should refrain from doing this
and, in the event that the fiduciary disobeys the proscription, the right 'should
be interpreted as including an implied entitlement to profits realized through the
exercise of fiduciary power'.' 0' The lynchpin to Miller's argument is the notion
that the power given to the fiduciary is a means which belongs to the principal. It
follows from the principal's exclusive claims to that means that 'others are under
a correlative obligation to refrain from appropriation of or interference with the
object of the right'. 0 2 This explains, in commutative justice terms, why a principal
should be entitled to disgorgement even where the profits are generated by way of
95 Paul B Miller, 'Justifying Fiduciary Duties' (2013) 58 McGill Law Journal 969
96 Ibid 1017
97 Ibid 1018
98 Ibid 1020
99 Ibid 1021; See also Weinrib's description of the fiduciary relationship as a situation in
which 'the beneficiary's interests are so completely at the mercy of the fiduciary that
the law disables the fiduciary from acting except in the beneficiary's interests' (Weinrib,
above n 9, 45) and Sarah Worthington's observation that fiduciary obligations cannot be
understood as duties to bring about a particular end position because it is impossible to
define that end position (Sarah Worthington, Equity (21d ed)(Clarendon Press, Oxford,
2006) 129). As Lord Wright explained, in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC
134, an enquiry about an end position would be 'as to what would have been the position
if that party had not acted as he did, or what he might have done if there had not been the
temptation to seek his own advantage' (at 154).
100 Miller, above n95, 1021
101 Paul B Miller, 'Justifying Fiduciary Remedies' (2013) 63 University of Toronto Law
Journal 570, 615
102 Ibid 617
the fiduciary's exploitation of an opportunity to which the principal had no pre-
existing claim, such as where a fiduciary receives a bribe.0 3 Miller's explanation
proceeds entirely in terms of why it is morally permissible for the principal to
take the profit from the fiduciary. The right to deprive the fiduciary of the profit
cannot belong to society as a whole or anyone other than the principal. Justifying
the principal's taking of the fiduciary's profits requires the consideration of norms
of distributive justice only if one conceives the question in terms of whether the
court or the state should take the benefit from the fiduciary and give it to the
principal - that is, as a question concerning the allocation of a resource.
The remaining question is whether the principal's right to take the fiduciary's
profit must always take a proprietary form- that is, necessarily justifies taking the
asset which constitutes the profit - or may sometimes involve merely a personal
right to demand that the fiduciary pay the monetary value of the profit. Miller's
emphasis upon the fiduciary power being a means which belongs exclusively to
the principal suggests that a transfer of the assets which constitute the fiduciary's
gain should be, at the very least, the default remedy. The suggestion is even
stronger in Lionel Smith's recent suggestion that the 'no-profit rule' is 'a primary
rule of attribution' 0 4 - that is, 'the profit is attributed to the beneficiary as a matter
of primary right' 105 There is apparent judicial support for such a position in
Australia. 0 6 Certainly, the proposition that proprietary relief is restricted to cases
in which the fiduciary had an obligation to acquire the asset or opportunity in
question for the principal has been rejected. 0 7
A contrasting stance is that recently taken by Sarah Worthington. 08 Worthington
has suggested that proprietary relief ought to be available in most cases but that
cases in which the profit is gained through 'exercise of the fiduciary's role' but
'involves no use of the principal's property nor pursuit of an opportunity within
the scope of the role' would attract only personal relief.0 9 As Worthington
103 Ibid 621-622
104 Smith, above n 37.
105 bid?
106 Furs Ltd v Tomkies (1936) 54 CLR 583, 592 (Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ)('belongs in
equity to the company'); Note, on the other hand, the cautious stance of Bant and Bryan
on this issue (Bant and Bryan, above n 2, 224 (n 76)).
107 Hospital Products Ltdv United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 107-108
(Mason J)
108 Sarah Worthington, 'Fiduciary duties and proprietary remedies: addressing the failure of
equitable formulae' (2013) 72 Cambridge Law Journal 720
109 Ibid 735; Note that Graham Virgo has drawn the line in a slightly different place - that
is, proprietary relief would be available 'where the profit [is] derived directly from the
principal's property ... or derived from the exploitation of an opportunity or right which was
available to the principal and would have benefited him had the fiduciary not intervened'
(Graham Virgo, 'Profits obtained in breach of fiduciary duty: personal or proprietary
claim? (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 502, 504). Virgo's formulation appears to
exclude the possibility of proprietary relief where it is improbable that the principal would
have procured the benefit in the event that the fiduciary had not, so would, in practice, be
more restrictive of proprietary relief than Worthington's formulation
acknowledged,"0 drawing the line in this way calls into question the Privy
Council's decision in Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid."' According
to Worthington, the claimant in Reid should have been restricted to a personal
remedy because, even though it was probable that the defendant could not have
made his real estate investment without having received the bribe, the rationale
for disgorgement in that case was merely 'to strip the fiduciary' of a profit and
'not to transfer to the principal an asset to which the principal is entitled ahead
of anyone else'." 2 The profit was made from exploiting an opportunity which the
fiduciary would not, in any circumstances, have had to pursue on behalf of his
principal.
A problem with restricting the principal to a personal claim in such cases is the
lack of a mechanism for the disgorgement of future gains which are causally linked
to the breach of fiduciary duty. The situation in Reid serves as an illustration. Mr
Reid used the bribe money to purchase real estate which appreciated in value.
As Worthington acknowledged," 3 it is unlikely that Mr Reid would have been
able to make that profitable investment without having received the bribe. Any
monetary remedy which a court could award in such a case would be limited to
profits which the fiduciary has accumulated up to the date of'judgment. Yet, since
it is conceivable that the fiduciary would, after judgment, continue to accumulate
profits which are causally linked to the breach of duty, a monetary remedy would
not be effective in bringing about a complete disgorgement of the fiduciary's
profits. To say that the principal has a right to the asset which the fiduciary
received in breach of duty so as to give the principal a right to the proceeds of
realisation or investment of that asset overcomes the difficulty in quantifying the
necessary disgorgement. "' It is consistent with a commutative justice account of
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty to insist that the fiduciary must give to the
principal the asset which constitutes the fiduciary's ill-gotten gain, at least in those
cases where it is difficult to quantify the fiduciary's profit. Such an approach to
the question of whether proprietary relief ought to be awarded would affirm the
outcome in Reid as well as that in the landmark Canadian case of LA C Minerals
Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd. "
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115 (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14; In that case, a majority of the Court concluded that the defendant
company held the land that it had acquired ('the Williams property') on constructive trust
for the plaintiff. Both breach of confidence and breach of fiduciary duty were argued and
only two members of the majority (La Forest and Wilson JJ) concluded that the defendant
had breached a fiduciary duty. The third member of the majority (Lamer J) concluded that
there had been no breach of fiduciary duty but there had been a breach of confidence. While
La Forest J noted that this was a case in which the constructive trust 'simply redirects
the title of the Williams property to its original course', his Lordship noted also that this
In cases like Reid, the argument is about 'what counts as the profit that the
defaulting fiduciary has made as a result of his breach of fiduciary duty'." 6 The
principal is entitled, as a matter of commutative justice, to take from the fiduciary
the addition to the fiduciary's wealth which is attributable to the breach of fiduciary
duty. Once the profit which the fiduciary has made by reason of the breach of duty
has been identified, the remaining question is one concerning the practicalities of
conveying that wealth from the fiduciary to the principal. It would be consistent
with the 'lesser interference' commitment of Anglo-Australian law"' to insist that
where the total addition to the fiduciary's wealth arising from the breach of duty
can be quantified at the time of judgment, the relief should take a monetary form.
In cases in which the addition to the fiduciary's wealth takes the form of an asset
which continues to produce profits for the fiduciary, the fiduciary should hold the
asset on constructive trust for the fiduciary. Such an approach proceeds on the
basis that the principal has a primary right to any benefit which accrues to the
fiduciary but whether the principal has a secondary right to the transfer of an asset
or to the monetary value of the benefit will depend upon the precise character
of that benefit and what is necessary to convey the benefit from the fiduciary to
the principal. Nevertheless, the question of the form of relief remains a question
about what is necessary to ensure that the fiduciary does what is right towards the
principal and, conversely, what is the principal justified in demanding.
(b) Irrelevance of Insolvency
If a claimant is, as a matter of commutative justice, justified in demanding that a
defendant transfer an asset to her, then the claimant's right to the asset ought not
to be defeated simply by the fact that the defendant has unsecured creditors whose
interests in being paid might be compromised in the event of the defendant's
insolvency."8 The interest of an unsecured creditor is not an entitlement to the
particular asset. It is merely an interest in maximising the value of the estate
which is available for satisfaction of the monetary claims of unsecured creditors.
The possibility that unsecured creditors may go unpaid - or receive only a fraction
of what is owing to them - is not a reason for refusing to give proprietary relief to
the payer. "I Equally, one ought to be deeply suspicious of cases in which the only
was a case in which 'the right of the property holder to have changes in value accrue to
his account rather than to the account of the wrongdoer' was important (at 51). Wilson J
commented that 'the imposition of a constructive trust ensures ... that the wrongdoer does
not benefit from his wrongdoing, an important consideration in equity which may not be
achieved by a damage award' (at 17).
116 FHR European Ventures LLP and Others v Mankarious and Others [2013] EWCA Civ 17
[14] (Lewinson LJ)
117 See above note 90 and accompanying text.
118 Note, in this connection, Sarah Worthington's observation that any policy argument that
the principal should rank behind the fiduciary's general creditors 'applies only to gains
made by the fiduciary which the fiduciary must not have' and 'does not apply to gains
which the principal must have' (Worthington, above n108, 750)
119 In Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, Deane J (of the High Court of Australia)
proposed that the effect of a constructive trust be postponed to the date of publication of
apparent reason for awarding proprietary relief was that a personal remedy would
be of no value to the claimant. 20 Both lines of argument displace the question of
the moral permissibility of demanding the transfer with a question concerning the
distributive effect of requiring the transfer.
(c) All Cases are Two-Party Cases
A claimant may, as a matter of commutative justice, be able to demand a transfer of
assets from a principal wrongdoer but may not be able to demand a transfer from a
third party transferee of the asset. The question of third party enforceability does
not turn upon the relative desert of the claimant and the third party. It is a matter
of the third party being entitled to refuse to transfer the asset to the claimant, even
though the principal wrongdoer would not have been entitled to refuse to transfer.
In other words, the alleged three-party case is actually a conglomeration of two
two-party cases.
The well-established bona fide purchaser without notice rule provides a simple
illustration of the appropriate pattern of reasoning. A transfer of x from A to B
may be impugned - so that A is entitled to demand a re-conveyance from B and a
court of equity will enforce this entitlement - but if C has acquired an interest in
x for valuable consideration and without notice of A's equitable interest, A cannot
demand a conveyance from C. This is precisely how the rule was understood in
the classic decision of Pilcher v Rawlins.'2' Lord Hatherley LC remarked that, on
a plea of bona fide purchaser without notice, 'equity declines all interference with
the purchaser, having ... no ground on which it can affect his conscience'.12 2 James
LJ said that, once good faith, the giving of consideration and lack of notice have
been established, 'this Court has no jurisdiction whatever to do anything more
than to let him depart in possession of that legal estate'. 23 Mellish LJ said that
'this Court will not take an estate from a purchaser who has bought for valuable
the court's reasons '[l]est the legitimate claims of third parties be adversely affected' (at
623). It might be remarked that the effect of such a postponement would have been to
limit the entitlements of the parties to personal entitlements against each other as to how
they were to divide the proceeds of sale of a jointly-owned asset. The correctness of this
outcome is not disputed. The case is best understood as one in which neither party had, in
the first place, a right to a transfer of an interest in the asset which was enforceable against
the whole world.
120 Peter Watts, 'Constructive trusts and insolvency' (2009) 3 Journal of Equity 250, 255;
Watts argued (at 274) that the payee's insolvency was 'a strong driver of the result' in Chase
Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Limited. Note, on the other hand,
Professor Birks's view that Chase Manhattan was a case in which it was 'affirmatively
proved' that the payer never had any intention to benefit the payee, so a resulting trust in
favour of the payer arose (Peter BH Birks, 'Restitution and Resulting Trusts' in S Goldstein
(ed), Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
1992) 347).
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consideration without notice'. 24 The common understanding that is apparent in
these statements is that the original transferor cannot enlist the aid of a court of
equity to compel the legal owner to re-convey the asset. One might say, in Kantian
terms, that it is not morally permissible for the original transferor to coerce the
bona fide purchaser of the legal estate. The court's lack of jurisdiction reflects the
moral impermissibility of coercing a legal owner who has purchased its interest
from the previous transferee, does not know of the original transferor's rights
against the previous transferee in respect of the same asset and is not negligent in
failing to have discovered the existence of those rights. What the court is certainly
not doing is performing a distribution between two or more claimants by reference
to their relative merits as claimants.
The bona fide purchaser rule is the easy case. Elise Bant and Michael Bryan
described the bona fide purchaser rle as 'a true defence that determines defendants'
liability once and for all' .125 In the same work, Bant and Bryan observed there are
a number of 'discretionary factors' which 'assume particular weight' in certain
types of cases concerning the award of proprietary relief. 26 In particular, such
factors are important in cases where proprietary disgorgement is sought: -
[W]here proprietary disgorgement is sought over the defendant's
original asset - for example, over a bribe taken by a fiduciary in breach
of duty, or land promised to the plaintiff pursuant to a contract or a
relied-upon representation - the authorities suggest that discretionary
factors properly and commonly bear directly on the availability and
nature of a proprietary remedy. The reason for this distinctive mode of
operation likely lies in the underlying justifications for proprietary relief
in such cases. In disgorgement cases, corrective justice considerations
are irrelevant. It follows that justification for proprietary relief must like
elsewhere, in concepts such as consent, deterrence and reward. 21
Bant and Bryan have suggested that the prejudice that a proprietary remedy
would visit upon a broad range of third party interests, such as those of investors,
unsecured creditors and employees of the defendant, 28 should be considered in
determining whether the relief awarded should be personal rather than proprietary.
The matter to be considered is the effect upon a third party of awarding proprietary
relief - or even a conjectural class of third parties 29 - in terms of the third
124 Ibid 273
125 Elise Bant and Michael Bryan, 'Defences, Bars and Discretionary Factors' in Elise Bant
and Michael Bryan (ed), The Principles ofProprietary Remedies, above n 2, 185, 190
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127 Ibid 201; See also Bant and Bryan, above n 2, in which the authors stated that corrective
justice justified proprietary restitution 'where the defendant has received an asset directly
from the plaintiff's own assets' (at 217) but disgorgement of secondary profits requires a
'fresh justification' (at 222). Accordingly, Bant and Bryan's account is a mixed corrective-
distributive justice account and is broadly similar to Harding's account.
128 Ibid 201-202
129 Although Bant and Bryan (at 203) state that '[a]ny person who may be affected by the
parties' ability to satisfy claims which are not specifically related to the particular
asset that is the subject of the claimant's claim. Here, Bant and Bryan were not
concerned with the moral permissibility of coercing a particular person to transfer
or relinquish a direct interest in the asset. They were concerned with the relative
desert of two or more claimants to an asset - or, in the case of creditors, whether
one claimant should be paid in full while others are left to participate in a pari
passu distribution of the remaining assets.
If, on the other hand, it is argued that a fiduciary becomes a constructive trustee
because that is the only effective means to deprive the fiduciary of the whole
of the gain which arises from the breach of duty, the mere possibility that the
fiduciary could become insolvent and that the interests of unsecured creditors
would be compromised in a future bankruptcy administration cannot stand in the
way of giving effect to the claimant's property right. Unsecured creditors or other
third parties are not the object of a demand to transfer a specific asset to the
claimant. Awarding proprietary relief has an effect on the distribution of wealth to
the potential detriment of other creditors, but this is simply a consequence of the
claimant's morally permissible coercion of the errant fiduciary. There is no direct
coercion of the third parties.
Bant and Bryan relied upon statements by the High Court of Australia in Giumelli
v Giumelli'3 and John Alexander 's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd 3'
and the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Grimaldi v Chameleon
Mining NL (No 2)132 which indicate that prejudice to the interests of third parties is
a legitimate reason for withholding proprietary relief and granting only personal
relief . 33 Treating the effects on third party interests as an affirmative reason for
denying proprietary relief creates a problem - namely, the problem of identifying
the relevant third party interests and ensuring that they are represented before the
court which has to discern whether and how those interests will be affected. Bant
and Bryan (and the High Court) were certainly conscious of this problem.'34 The
problem disappears if the decisions in the cases mentioned are taken to stand for a
narrower proposition - that is, since it is possible that there are other persons whose
interests might be adversely affected by the award of proprietary relief, a court
should take care to ensure that the relief awarded is no more than is necessary to
making of a proprietary order' ought to be joined as a party to the litigation. See also
John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1, 53 (par
153). See also Michael Bryan, 'Constructive Trusts: Understanding Remedialism' in Jamie
Glister and Pauline Ridge (ed), Fault Lines in Equity (Hart, Oxford, 2012) 215, 235 in
which Bryan remarked that a doctrine of remedial constructive trusts that allows the award
of a constructive trust 'in order to give effect to the claimant's subjective preference to own
or recover property ... will only be workable if it is supplemented by adjectival provisions
directed to indentifying whether the dispute is in fact a 'three-party' contest'.
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vindicate fully the claimant's rights against the defendant. Such an interpretation
is consonant with the general notion, referred to earlier, that remedies which
constitute a lesser interference with the defendant's freedom should be preferred
to those which constitute a greater interference.
The case of Giumelli v Giumelli may be used to illustrate the point. In that case,
the concern was that the plaintiff had, as a consequence of his parents' creation
of an expectation that he would be given a portion of the family land, given up
opportunities to earn a living elsewhere and invested his energies into the working
and improvement of the family property. The plaintiff was entitled to relief on the
ground of equitable estoppel and was awarded the monetary value of the interest
that he expected to receive. The decision to award a monetary sum, rather than
a transfer of an interest was given the double-barrelled justification that it was
,necessary both to avoid injustice to others [particularly the plaintiff's brother] and
to avoid relief which went beyond what was requiredfor conscientious conduct by
Mr and Mrs Giumelli'. 35 The proposition might have been equally well expressed
in terms of not using a 'sledgehammer' when a 'scalpel' would suffice,'36 lest the
use of the proverbial sledgehammer have adverse consequences for those who
are not parties to the litigation. The narrower proposition is consistent with the
commutative justice account. A person ought not to be coerced to any greater
extent than is necessary to vindicate the claimant's rights.
The interests of third parties were not the only considerations that were apparently
inplay inthe cases under discussion. Bant and Bryan recognised that it is appropriate
for a court to refuse proprietary relief 'where it would force the parties into an
ongoing dysfunctional relationship'. "I This 'clean break' consideration provided
a reason for the refusal of proprietary relief in cases such as Giumelli v Giumelli
and Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2). Bringing this consideration into
account can be reconciled with the commutative justice account. It will be recalled
that, under Weinrib's Kantian account of private law, rights can be 'provisionally
understood in abstraction from the judgment of any public institution' 38 , but the
effective enforcement of those rights requires that those rights 'operate within
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Ltd (1998) 195 CLR 566, 585 (par 42) the High Court said that a court should consider
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'care must be taken to avoid granting equitable relief which goes beyond the necessities
of the case' but that a constructive trust should not be declared 'in a manner injurious to
third parties merely because the plaintiff has no other useful remedy against a defendant'.
The context of the latter remark was a discussion of whether a constructive trust may be
awarded because other remedies 'lack practical utility because of the impecuniosity of
those against whom they are sought' (italics added). See also Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014]
HCA 19 (par 85).
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a public and systematic framework that has supplementary requirements of its
own'. 39 That public and systematic framework involves adjudication by courts
which award relief to claimants so as to resolve once and for all their disputes
with the relevant defendants. A form of relief which would require the parties to
maintain an ongoing relationship involving regular negotiation of the detail of
their entitlements is a recipe for generating further disputes. This is, of course, the
key consideration which underlies the well-accepted notion that a court ought to
refuse to award specific performance of a contract if the decree would require the
constant supervision of the court. 40
'Clean break' considerations may operate either in favour of or against the award
of proprietary relief. In Giumelli, they operated against the award of proprietary
relief because bringing about a transfer of land from the defendants to the plaintiff
would have involved subsequent cooperation between the parties in order to
identify the land to be transferred and to perform the necessary subdivision. It
was not simply a matter of the defendants signing an instrument of transfer. In
Attorney-Generalfor Hong Kong v Reid,'4' a 'clean break' consideration operated
in favour of proprietary relief in so far as there was an identifiable asset which
represented the proceeds of the bribes and awarding merely an account of profits
would not have captured the benefits which would have accrued to the defendant
by way of post-judgment increases in the value of that asset. For as long as the
defendant continued to be the owner of the land, a regular accounting as to the
increase in his wealth derived from his ownership of the land would have been
necessary. No lesser degree of coercion would have constituted both a 'clean
break' and full disgorgement to the claimant of the defendant's gain. The question
is ultimately a question of what coercion of the defendant is morally permissible
in the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the practicalities of resolving the
dispute once and for all.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether one understands the legal entitlements which emerge from adjudication
in terms of commutative justice or distributive justice affects what one may
recognise as a legitimate consideration in the determination of both the
defendant's liability and the form that the court's relief may take. From the
perspective of those who insist that the law which emerges from adjudication is
concerned only with commutative justice, the distributive justice account rests
upon a mistaken assumption that legal entitlements are designed to produce the
distributive consequences that they have. Only such an assumption can underpin
an insistence that the configuration of legal entitlements (including property
rights) be justified in terms of whether they advance a social vision respecting
parties' relationships. Commutative justice accounts, whether 'constructivist' or
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'evolutionary', understand entitlements, not as the product of design, but as the
product of interactions between pairs of human beings. The role of courts is to
centralise and regularise the interpretation and enforcement of these entitlements.
Interpretation of entitlements and the justification of the configuration of those
entitlements in particular cases proceeds according to arguments which are
particularisations of the abstract form which is immanent in the existing system
of entitlements - namely, commutative justice. All justifications must consist of
arguments about whether one particular person's coercion of another particular
person is morally permissible. Questions about the form of relief must focus upon
what coercion of the defendant is necessary - but no more than necessary - in
order to give effect to the claimant's entitlement. Proprietary relief is justified if
requiring the defendant to transfer an asset to the claimant is the least coercion
that would give the claimant that to which it is entitled as a matter of commutative
justice. Neither the mere fact that the defendant is insolvent nor the mere existence
of third party claims defeat proprietary claims which are justified as a matter of
commutative justice.
